Idiosyncrasy of the State and God: An Analysis on Religiosity and Ideology in Latin America

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Available at: https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/csp/vol15/iss1/2
Idiosyncrasy of the State and God: An Analysis on Religiosity and Ideology in Latin America

James D. Fiorenza

In this research paper, I will be analyzing the relationship between the religiosity of Latin America in terms of popular religion and religiosity of its followers, and how it has impacted and continues to impact the political systems of Latin America in terms of ideology. I will be conducting this research by conducting three case studies following the development of my hypothesis, my research of my case nations and the collecting of all needed data. After this, I will compare all my data and establish a well-developed conclusion which accurately conveys and demonstrates this data. My research will focus on answering this research question: How has religiosity impacted voting results for political parties of certain ideologies in Latin America? I am researching this subject to understand the intense and rapid political evolution of Latin America, in the context of religion and religiosity. To understand this change in the past century-and consequently be able to predict future development of ideology in Latin America- we need to understand the cultural change of Latin America and the cultural factors which impact ideology. I had two main hypotheses regarding my research- firstly, that an increase in Religiosity has led to an increase in votes for Revolutionary/Leftist parties in Latin America, and secondly that votes in elections in the 20th Century had a reactionary lean, but has since developed a revolutionary lean in the 21st Century. My research invalidated my first hypothesis and somewhat validated my second hypothesis, as there was very little correlation for support for leftist parties and religiosity. However, religiosity eventually did move from reactionary ideology closer to the center, and in some cases the center-left somewhat validating my second hypothesis that religiosity has gradually moved further left, albeit not as far left as predicted.

INTRODUCTION

We as American citizens are accustomed to living in a secular society with the formal separation of church and state, yet we cannot deny the impact religious institutions—notably the Church—have on political dialogue and the very identity of political groups in the United States. However, even with the U.S being a more religious country amongst other wealthy countries (Lipka), the U.S still has a lower level of religiosity compared to many of our Latin American neighbors south. For example, as of 2018 Mexico’s population is overwhelmingly Catholic, with only 10.6% of Mexicans not identifying with any religion (statista.com). Religiosity remains high in the rest of Central & South America as well, with 69% of the adult population identifying as Catholic, 19% identifying as Protestant and merely 8% being Unaffiliated (Pew Research).

I hope this information serves to bring the reader’s attention to the impact religion can have on political norms, and use this information to lead into the research question of this paper: How has religiosity impacted voting results for political parties of certain ideologies in Latin America? When I ask this research question, I will evaluate if the population’s social and historical conditions impact the nation’s religiosity via my case study. Will break every nation’s popular ideology into three categories: Reactionary indicates a tilt farther right, revolutionary indicates a tilt farther left, and no change or centrist indicates no noticeable correlation, and use the last 3 elections to determine the correlation between religiosity and ideology. And, we
will look at each of these cultures from the context of the past century - from the 1920’s to the 2020’s. My two hypotheses for my research are: Firstly, an increase in Religiosity has led to an increase in votes for Revolutionary/Leftist parties in Latin America. Secondly, votes in elections in the 20th Century had a reactionary lean, but has developed a revolutionary lean in the 21st Century. The results of my research showed that while religiosity did not have a correlation with support for revolutionary ideology/Leftist parties, gradually religiosity did move from supporting reactionary parties to more centrist and center-left parties. These findings completely invalidated my first hypothesis, but did somewhat validate my second hypothesis.

**LITERATURE REVIEW OF RELIGIOSITY AND IDENTITY**

As Claude Dargent’s (2019) research shows, the popular form in which religiosity presents itself can have an impact on the popularity of certain political figures, groups or parties in countries. This correlation was seen in the French elections in 2017, where the popularity of Catholicism has followed with a right wing vote, yet the majority of Muslims and Protestants in France held a left-wing vote.

Similar results showed certain religious groups holding distinct voting patterns in Kai Arzheimer and Elisabeth Carter’s (2019) work which showed that many religious groups—such as Catholics in Germany—vote Left exclusively. Another notable factor to the voting results of these religious groups was the religiosity of the voting population, as Dargent asserts that “that strong religiosity is conducive to a right-wing vote and distances the population of Catholics and those with ‘no religion’ from a left-wing vote”. This is similar to many parts of Latin America, where the contention between religious minorities and the Catholic majority does express itself in support for certain political parties.

Additionally, my research shows that the higher the religiosity of the population, the more committed they may be to their parties. Arzheimer and Carter’s work, in addition to supporting the claim that certain groups vote a certain way, shows that some religious voting populations have a strong tendency to vote Conservative, but not Far-right. In the case of Germany and Austria, the history of the far-right in these countries and its zealous anti-clericalism has pushed the Catholic population away from the far right, and into the arms of the more center-right Christian Democrats. In Norway and Denmark, these far-right parties have Libertarian roots that do not align with the interests of religiously-minded voters. Siobhan McAndrew (2020) showed the opposite results in the United Kingdom, as Protestants and the highly-religious were drawn to the far right due to a multitude of different historical and socio-cultural factors. This can be seen in my case studies with Protestants and the Left, as Protestants and other religious minorities are more inclined to the left than the right in my case studies for a variety of reasons due to suppression of them as religious minorities by the Catholic Church in Latin America.

Also, religiosity can increase the severity of political extremism based on the historical context, as we will see in my case studies as well. Referring back to McAndrew’s research, support from the Anglican population in the UK for reactionary values was high. McAndrew states that “For Anglican affiliation, 60% of the indirect effect works through agreement that immigration is too high; 15% through left-right identification; 15% through authoritarianism; and 7% through identification with Englishness rather than Britishness. For monthly attendance, an estimated 72% of
the indirect effect on support for Leave works through immigration attitudes, namely disagreeing immigration numbers are too high. An estimated 8% works through lower economic confidence, and 8% through being less likely to feel more English than British.” The majority support for these social views translates to a support for reactionary parties, and a merge of Christian identity with Nationalist parties in the UK. Referring back to Claude Dargent’s research, research indicates that an increase in religiosity can lead to an amplification of political views—pushing you further left or right. In my case studies—notably Mexico—the historical context of religion in a country as well as what religiosity is identified as in a country can impact how reactionary or revolutionary a religious group is.

THEORY OF MY RESEARCH

With the evidence collected from my literature review I will now begin my discussion on the theory of my research. My theory is based around these two hypotheses:

Hypothesis I:
- An increase in Religiosity has led to an increase in votes for Revolutionary/Leftist parties in Latin America.

Hypothesis II:
- Votes in elections in the 20th Century had a reactionary lean, but has developed a revolutionary lean in the 21st Century.

These will be the hypotheses that I will base my research around to find the answer to, and either validate, invalidate, somewhat validate or somewhat invalidate this research. Before I begin my research, I will discuss my variables and how I will measure my research in my methodology section.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The independent variables (IV) of my research are the previously established historical, cultural and geopolitical variables of Latin America, beyond the control of other variables in my research.

Independent variables

My independent variables focus on religiosity, which includes: The popular religions of Latin America, ethnic and cultural makeup of a country, immigration patterns, popularity of religious figures/leaders, domestic insurrections, religiosity of a nation’s population, and any governments put into power undemocratically.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MY DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variables (DV) in my research will be built upon the historical and political precedents set by the IV of Latin America. Essentially, my DV are dependent on the outcome of my IV and how they impact the countries we analyze. These DV will be used to measure how religious a country is, how that religiosity manifests itself [popular religions], and what ideologies become popular as a result of this. These DV will be looked at from a higher-or-lower metric.

Dependent variables

The dependent variables of my research focus on ideology, which includes the following: influence of religious institutions on governments, political party affiliation per religious groups, voting results per religious groups, and governments voted into power democratically. These three DV will be in regards to religion’s role in my case study countries’ societies, but the last two DV will relate
to how religious populations impact the political tides of a country via elections.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MY CONTROL VARIABLES

Essentially, this is the data of my research that must stay consistent throughout my research in order for me to be able to accurately gather and assess information. These variables will remain constant in my research.

Control variables

The CV of my research are: my 3 research subject nations [Brazil, Mexico, Colombia], the time period my research will be looking at in Latin American history [1920’s-2020’s], the division of religions in my research, and how I measure religiosity.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLES

IDEOLOGY DEFINED: THE LEFT

Economically, ideologies on the Center-Revolutionary scale move away from capitalist systems, democratizing and regulating the economy in the Center-Left to outright abolishing Capitalism on the Revolutionary level. Similarly, on the social scale the Left tends to promote the importance of progress, individuality and transcendence over tradition and current interpretations of right and wrong.

IDEOLOGY DEFINED: THE RIGHT

While on the Far-Left government control of the economy is exerted through the use of Unions and state institutions to give the means of production to the working class, the Far-Right on its farthest point gives power of the economy to the nation-state through Corporatism, or as Merriam Webster defines it, “the organization of a society into industrial and professional corporations serving as organs of political representation and exercising control over persons and activities within their jurisdiction”. On the more moderate scale, they are Capitalist and rigorously defend free enterprise. Socially, Center-Right and Reactionary governments most often align with Conservative values, including a strong emphasis on the importance of tradition, the protection of cultural/national identity from outside forces and the state acting as a “bulwark” from seemingly destructive influences of the modern world. The major difference between the Center-Right and the Reactionary-Right is how they choose to conserve traditional society.

LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY

The more democratic nations on my spectrum will be the Center-Left and Center-Right nations that rely on elections, free markets and have more civil liberties than the nations on the Reactionary and Revolutionary spectrums. To organize my data into a readable format, I’ve created the Five Point Idiosyncrasy Metric in Graphic 1-1.
RELIOGISTRY DEFINED

For my data on the religious demographics of Latin America, I will be using data collected by Statista.com from a survey done by Corporación Latinobarómetro, a public opinion study that conducts 20,000 interviews in over 18 Latin American countries to represent more than 600 million residents. I will look primarily at the results of Primarily Catholic voting records, as they are the biggest religious groups, but in my case studies I will look at the political ideology of Catholicism and religious minorities in those countries. As I measure religiosity, I will measure an increase or decrease in religiosity in how the behaviors of these religious groups align with this factor: activeness of attendance to temple/church services. Each of these factors will account for 20% of the six-point pyramid scale, making each 20th percentile account for a fraction of religiosity, and as each factor is met it will add 20% if the factor is fully met, and 10% if it is partially met. If it is not met at all it will not be added to the overall percentage of religiosity. The pyramid scale in Graphic 1-2 will be used to show my measurement of religiosity.
Summary

To conclude my methodology section, I have combined my two idiosyncrasy graphics into one to maximize the ability for me to measure and compare my results from my case-study research. The purpose of the combined idiosyncrasy scale is to visually measure the connection between religiosity and ideology in an easy to read and visually measurable metric (Graph 1-3). The combined Idiosyncrasy Scale is my tool in measuring the connection between religiosity and idiosyncrasy. For each of the factors of religiosity met, a country's position on the graph will go up by 20%, and only 10% if partially met. And for the political position of a religious group in a country based on my dependent variables, their position will slide either left or right.

Graph 1-2: This idiosyncrasy pyramid determines the intensity of religiosity within the religious groups of my research. The 5 points defining religiosity are put into percentages, organized into 5 segments of data, from 0% representing a “unorthodox religiosity” and 100% being a “Orthodox religiosity”.

Fiorenza Combined Idiosyncrasy Scale
CASE STUDY OF MY SUBJECT COUNTRIES: MEXICO, COLOMBIA, BRAZIL

CASE STUDY 1: MEXICO

During the 1930’s the Cristeros Rebellion had developed in Mexico as “Catholic resistance against an anticlerical and socialist Mexican government” (Velazquez). This frustration and the following popular movement amongst the Catholic traditionalists and Conservatives of Mexico evolved as a reaction to the anticlerical legal measures taken in the Constitution of 1917. The Right had a united front in the form of the Cristeros, but the Left as a part of the Mexican revolution was a wide socio-economic and political “umbrella” of groups- local politicos, constitutional clergymen, freemasons and radical teachers. Politically, the revolutionaries included liberals, anarchists and socialists-most of whom were anti-clerical. But it also included reformist Christians, Spiritists and other Deists. Many of these “religious dissidents, Protestants, spiritists, and others...held anti-Catholic convictions but maintained deeply spiritual inclinations” and “joined the revolution in droves” (Bantjes). A major reason for this united front against the Catholic Church is due to the historical privilege the Catholic Church held in Latin American society. In the eyes of the Mexican Left, the church was the enemy of “reform and Liberal progress” (Mecham).

In response to revolutionary zeal and the Calles Laws, Mexican Catholics organized against the revolution and on March 14th, 1925 the National League for Defense of Religious Liberty (LNLDLR) was founded by Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra- a militant member of the Social Action Congresses and the defunct National Catholic Party. The League used its position as an all-encompassing Catholic coalition to call for an insurrection on January 1st 1927 in Rene Capistran Garza’s manifesto A La Nacion. And during the Cristeros Rebellion, Protestants were persecuted heavily with dozens of incidents of mob assaults on Protestants occuring from the beginning of the Christeros Rebellion to its end in the 30’s. Catholic radicals in Mexico often considered the struggle against the Revolution as a dual-struggle against Communism and Protestants-who were more likely to support the Revolution than be against it (Klopp- SantaMaria).

Negotiations with the Cristeros and Revolutionary Regime evolved into a form of agreements between the Church and the State in the form of the Arreglos (the Agreements). Following these concessions to the Church, the religious violence did subside, yet the lack of reconciliation among radical Catholics led to the Sinarquista Movement in 1937. Unlike their Cristeros progenitors, the Sinarquista movement was explicitly peaceful and apolitical (Velazquez). Yet, the concessions of Liberal President Lázaro Cárdenas made great strides in deradicalizing the right, and with Mexico entering to WWII changed the paradigm the Sinarquista operated in- no longer was it a peaceful religious movement, but a Reactionary political pool the Axis powers could pull from to bring fascism to Mexico. After the Sinarquist paper El Sinarquista was found making a call to arms for the military to overthrow the government to stop a “Communist Takeover”, El Sinarquista was suspended, a ban imposed on their meetings and an investigation being launched by the government (Velazquez).

CASE STUDY 2: COLOMBIA

Where Mexico had its Cristeros Rebellion, Columbia had its devastating period of political violence from 1948 to 1958, in a period known as La Violencia-a political conflict between Liberal and Conservative factions in Colombia. The first embers of La
Violencia happened in 1930 with the election of Liberal Party leader Enrique Olaya Herrera after a period of Conservative dominance. The ensuing anti-conservative violence from the left flared into politically motivated massacres, assassinations, looting and destruction of churches—especially in Boyaca and Santander. In the 1946 election, the Liberals were divided between the moderates and populists in the party, which led to a minority but united Conservative party taking the election (World Peace Foundation).

During this tenure of Conservative dominance and political violence, Liberals and the Revolutionary Left in Colombia waged an active rebellion against the Conservative government. The Liberal coalition consisted of mostly center-left Social Democrats, while the revolutionary left and many radicals in the Liberal party were excluded from the National front coalition of 1957 due to their extremism—notably the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) and Jacobins (Bailey). The formation of the National Front—a coalition between Liberals and Conservatives—finally pushed an already radicalized working class to revolt. The major reasons for this revolution was the failure of the National Front to provide any meaningful change via policy, which made the front seem ineffective and elitist (Turel). Furthermore, the attempts of the coalition government to violently eliminate these Communist movements only emboldened them. These revolutionary movements would flourish until the collapse of the Meddin and Cali cartels in the 80’s cut off the easy access of drug routes to traffic drugs, which would severely cut off their funding and ability to project power.

Conservatives’ memories of their mistreatment by the Left invigorated and radicalized those on the right to become reactionary. Inevitably, reactionary right-wing paramilitaries eventually rose to meet the growing threat of revolutionary groups. The scale and power of these right-wing paramilitaries blossomed under the passing of Law 48 in 1968, which gave civilians the legal permission to take part in the war and gave the government the right to train and give resources to pro-government right wing paramilitaries. Many times these groups acted just as brutally as revolutionaries—they too participated in the drug trade, displaced indigenous communities, massacred civilians, kidnapped political figures and even extorted local citizens via a “protection fee” (Hanson).

As it is in most Latin American countries, the Catholic Church was a powerful and prominent institution in Colombia. Conservatives naturally leaned towards supporting the Catholic church in Colombia, as they viewed it as a unifying spiritual order needed for a strong conservative state. By contrast, the Liberals in Colombia valued individualism, rationalism and personal liberty over order and thus wanted to limit the church’s civil influence. The growth of Protestantism came with resentment from the powers that be in the Catholic Church, and many Protestants feared Conservatives pro-clericalism and anti-liberalism. This fear came true as reactionary candidate Laureano Gomez won the election in 1946, as he actively denounced Protestants, socialists and communists and under his regime violence against all of these groups was at its highest. This only solidified the Liberal Party as the Protestant’s party, and thus pushed Protestant’s Left on the political spectrum in Colombia (Dailey).

**CASE STUDY 3: BRAZIL**

During the Old Republic regime in Brazil, a significant lack of investment into many of the more disparate regions of Brazil, as well as the governments indifference to the plight of many regions created a toxic relationship between unappreciated and
exploited states and the Republican government (Brown University). This division boiled into multiple revolts in Brazilian history, most notably the Contestado Rebellion of 1912-1916. The revolt was the result of local grievances following the development of industry and railroads into the Contestado region—which despite bringing new opportunities to the rural peasants of the region, it also brought new problems to these regions that local infrastructure could not manage (Siegel).

The Contestado Rebellion would convince many military leaders that direct federal action was needed in rebellious regions—rather than state forces. This change in attitude regarding the Old Republic led to a set of revolts led by middle class junior officers known as the Tenete Revolts against mandatory conscription and for social reforms, an economic depression and as a response to a populist military coup by President Getúlio Vargas. He would overthrow the Old Republic and transition it to the “Estado Nuevo” (Brown University).

The end state of the Brazilian Revolution of 1930 was a Right-wing dictatorship that reigned for 15 years. Yet, the more moderate leadership of Vargas led to less aggressive action from the left compared to our previous examples. Despite this the Revolutionary Left worked against him regardless. The Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) was the first line of offense against the Vargas regime from the left, and had international support from the Comintern (Dulles). The Vargas regime responded to pressures from the far left by cracking down on political dissidents, and in July of 1935 he officially outlawed the National Liberation Alliance—a antifascist and anti-imperialist coalition of several democratic organizations that numbered around 1.5 million members (Soviet Encyclopedia).

Politically aligned and religiously Catholic political groups exploited the political instability of the 1920’s-1940’s to halt the decreasing influence of Catholicism. The biggest of these was the Catholic Electoral League (LEC), and rather than attempt to re-Catholicize Brazil through missionary work, the Electoral League did so through “revamping the hostile or, at best, indifferent legal structure of the nation in order that Brazil’s political structure might reflect it’s (assumed) religious bias” (Williams).

The political participation of Protestants in Brazil has always been based around self-protection in a country historically against them. The first protestants in Brazil came from the French Huguenots in Rio de Janeiro and Dutch Calvinists in North-East Brazil in the 17th Century, and these new immigrant groups would bring religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants. Anglicans and Lutherans would still go on to establish more permanent settlements in Brazil, and following the end of the Vargas regime, Baptists and Presbyterians united behind the National Democratic Union and progressive movements (Da Silva).

ANALYSIS

To find my data on the religiosity of my case study countries in relation to election cycles, I will use the metrics found in Georgetown University’s Center for the Applied Research of the Apostolate, as a legitimate academic source on religious figures and statistics. I will be looking through 3 different, sequential election cycles to track changes in religiosity and the results of political elections.

ANALYSIS OF MEXICO

As of 2012, only 50.1% of Mexican adult Catholics actively attend worship services. The 2012 elections in Mexico led to a victory
for the coalition party the Partido Verde Ecológista de México (PVEM) as the Compromiso por México Coalition. In 2006, adult attendance of mass was slightly higher at 50.6% and the farther right PAN under Felipe Calderón Hinojosa won the national election with 35.9% of the votes, meanwhile our 2012 victors the PRI and PVEM got a mere 22.2% of presidential votes under the Alianza por México-Coalition. We could argue that the slight increase in religiosity led to a far-right party winning the election, yet this would not explain why the Center-left coalition Coalición por el Bien de Todos- consisting of the Partido de la Revolución Democrática/PR, Partido del Trabajo/PT and the Movimiento Ciudadano/MC- won nearly as many votes as the PAN, with 35.3% to be specific. And when we look at the religiosity of Mexican Catholics in 2000, religiosity was significantly higher at 62.3%. During the 2000 election, the PAN-PVEM Coalition the Alianza por el Cambio dominated the presidential elections with 42.5% of the votes under Vicente Fox Quesada. This was an overwhelming victory for the right-wing coalition, as the closest party electorally was the PRI with 36.1% (electionresources.org).

As my case study showed, Catholics in Mexico have an intense connection to the far-right politically. While the Cristeros Rebellion ended nearly a century ago, the effects of the conflict can still be seen in the electoral outcomes in Mexico. However, as religiosity decreased over the span of 12 years, voters began to move further to the Center-Right, showing itself in support for the more moderate PRI. To illustrate my data, I have presented my results in the combined idiosyncrasy scales for 2000-2012 below:

![Mexico-2012](image-url)
Mexico-2006

Mexico-2000

Fiorenza: Idiosyncrasy of the State and God: An Analysis on Religiosity and
ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIA
In 2014, the center-right Unity Party (more formally, the Partido Social de Unidad Nacional or Partido de la U) won the presidential election with Juan Manuel Santos Calderón as their candidate. “The U” won the election with 50.95% of the votes nationally registered. The closest other candidate came in terms of votes was Óscar Iván Zuluaga from the Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) party, a center-left party (electionguide.org) that had 45% of the votes. In 2014 Colombian adult Catholics attended mass regularly at a rate of 53.3% - a rate even higher than Mexico in 2014. What this tells us is that despite having a higher religiosity than even Mexico, Colombian Catholics are closer to the center politically, which could indicate that religiosity does not have as much of an impact on political tides as expected. The Unity Party won the elections of 2010 as well, but with less votes than seen in 2014: only 46.68% instead. This correlates with the results of the 2014 election, as the religiosity is the same as 2014 and the electoral results are similar. However, if we look at the 2006 elections, it was the Democratic Center and Alvaro Vélez who won with 62.35% of presidential votes, but the vote was much more divisive than in 2014. Carlos Diaz of the center left Polo Democrático Alternativo won the majority of the votes in a 3-way split (22.03%). Regardless, these parties are all closer to the Center-Left and do not go anywhere near the revolutionary left. Interestingly, this correlated with 47.6% of adult Catholics regularly attending mass regularly as of 2005 (electionresources.org).

I can also conclude that a lack of religiosity in Colombia can lead to a higher support for the center-left in Colombia, but in the later presidential elections from 2006 to 2014 support for center-right ideology increased. To show this change over the three decades, as seen below:
Fiorenza: Idiosyncrasy of the State and God: An Analysis on Religiosity and

Colombia-2010

Colombia-2006

Spring 2023, Vol. 15, Issue 1
ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL

During the 2014 election cycle, Brazilian Catholic religiosity was at 53.9% and during this election Presidential candidate Dilma Rousseff won the election with her center-left coalition led by the Workers Party (PT), with 41.6% of the votes. The second most popular candidate was the Social-Democrat Aécio Neves and his coalition led by the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), with 33.5% of the votes (America’s Barometer). The religiosity of Brazil was less prominent in 2010 and 2006, as only 44.8% of Catholics attended worship regularly in Brazil, yet the PT and Roussef won the election with 46.9% of the votes, followed by the PSDB candidate, José Serra, who received 32.6% of the votes in this election. In 2006, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (or simply Lula) won the Presidential election for the PT with 48.6% of the national votes, and following him was PSDB candidate Geraldo Alckmin with 41.6% of the votes (CARA).

It could be argued that Brazilian Catholics are more center-left as they have not experienced as much “bad blood” between Leftists and the church as their brethren in Mexico and Colombia. To illustrate the centrist attitude between religion and ideology in Brazil, I have charted the correlation below:
CONCLUSION
Before we can begin my conclusion, I will now refer to my hypotheses.
Hypothesis I:
• An increase in Religiosity has led to an increase in votes for Revolutionary/Leftist parties in Latin America.
Hypothesis II:
• Votes in elections in the 20th Century had a reactionary lean, but has developed a revolutionary lean in the 21st Century.

While my data from Brazil has a more center-left correlation, this does not come close to the revolutionary lean I predicted. In regards to Colombia and Mexico, Colombia correlated with Center-right ideology initially and in more recent elections has moved towards more center-left ideology, while Mexico had the furthest push right. From this, I can conclude that in regards to religiosity and ideology, my first hypothesis is invalid—religiosity does not correlate with an increase in Revolutionary ideology. In regards to my second hypothesis, religious votes and religiosity did in fact turn less reactionary in the 20th and 21st century compared to the 18th and 19th centuries. However, this change was more center-left than revolutionary. For this, I can consider my second hypothesis somewhat validated.

SUMMARY
What my data tells us is that religious organizations and their constituents are groups that, just like any other group of people, have their own interests which they impress on the governments of their countries via the electoral system. What we can hope to achieve with this data is to see what motivates religious groups to vote a certain way as an indicator of what their needs are as a community based on historical and socio-economic contexts—and from there actively work to create mutual policies on a community, state and national level that benefit all parties and religious groups.

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Spring 2023, Vol. 15, Issue 1


