Downtown redevelopment and homeless services: history and factors of the Soledad Street controversy

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Downtown Redevelopment and Homeless Services: History and Factors of the Soledad Street Controversy

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Downtown Redevelopment and Homeless Services:
History and Factors Behind the Soledad Street Controversy

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This work is dedicated to the people of Salinas, the Chinatown neighborhood, and all those who have made this research possible.
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Abstract

The Soledad Street/Chinatown Revitalization Project of Salinas, California currently faces the challenge of defining the future role of homeless services in a revitalized neighborhood. This research seeks to support that process through the identification of factors contributing to the failure to find a permanent location for the provision of homeless services in central Salinas. Focusing primarily on the role of the Downtown Social Service Board, this research utilizes content analysis of public records to support a qualitative analysis of records and semi-structured interviews. It is concluded that the primary factor has been the creation of the Swinging Door Drop-in Center as a resource for the redevelopment of the Salinas Downtown. Subsequent factors include the creation of the Downtown Social Service Board as a growth coalition, and a transfer of responsibility through the creation of the Wheel of Hope.
Introduction

What that follows is a story of inter-spatial conflict and the use of homeless services to support downtown redevelopment. The Soledad Street/Chinatown Revitalization Project is currently grappling with this reality and has begun to ask the question of whether or not homeless services can compatibly exist in a revitalized community. At the current stage the answer to this has not been decided, so it is the purpose of this research to document the establishment of some of Soledad Street’s homeless services and to ask the question:

What factors have contributed to the inability to find a permanent location for the provision of homeless services in central Salinas?

In 1974 a pilot facility, called the Swinging Door Drop-in Center, was established in the downtown area of Salinas, California to address problems of homelessness, vagrancy and public drunkenness. Concurrent with its establishment was the adoption of the Salinas Central City Planning and Revitalization Program that officially launched the City’s attempt to bring a “new face” to the downtown along with increased business activity and economic opportunity. By 1982 the number of arrests for public intoxication had dropped from 10,000 to 1,600 per year and downtown redevelopment was well on its way to reality. At that time an organization was created, the Salinas Downtown Social Service Center Board (later changed to Downtown Social Service Board or DSSB as it will from now on be referenced), to help secure funding for, and to oversee, the Downtown’s solution to the homeless problem. Four years later that solution, the Swinging Door, was established at a new location, across the tracks from downtown, in Salinas’ historic Chinatown. Over the next twenty years the DSSB contributed to the economic revitalization of Downtown and played a critical role in the establishment of Soledad Street as a hub for homeless services in central Salinas.

Historically the Soledad Street/Old Chinatown neighborhood has always been a place for marginalized peoples. What was once a thriving home for the Chinese, Japanese and Filipino Pilipino communities has become a center for drug abuse, prostitution and homelessness. The ACTION Council of Monterey County (2005) estimated the presence
of some 1,500 homeless individuals in Monterey County, fifty percent of whom reside in the Salinas area. Within the City of Salinas, the Old Chinatown community and Soledad Street in particular, have been the hub for homeless services since the 1980’s. Today Soledad Street is home to a majority of the City of Salinas’s homeless services facilities including 1) Dorothy’s Place Hospitality Center which sponsors a homeless day shelter, a women’s night shelter and a soup kitchen, 2) Victory Mission and the Men in Transition, men’s shelters and job training facilities, as well as the 3) John the XXIII needle exchange.

With the guidance and vision of California State University Monterey Bay (CSUMB), a $600,000 grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development is currently being applied in the facilitation of a community based planning process to bring revitalization and redevelopment to the Chinatown neighborhood. The grant builds on a previous ten year relationship between the Service Learning Institute of CSUMB and Dorothy’s Place, bringing new resources for neighborhood change. The first step in this process has been the creation of the Salinas Downtown Community Board (SDCB), a twenty-four member community organization meant to reflect the diverse stakeholders of the area (Foundation of California State University Monterey Bay, 2005). The vision of the group, as defined May 23, 2006 is “to create a safe, welcoming, revitalized and accessible neighborhood that embraces its cultural history, richness and diversity, offering housing, economic opportunities and community services” in the Soledad Street/Chinatown area (Salinas Downtown Community Board, May 23, 2006).

But should homeless services remain a part of the revitalized Chinatown? The birth of the community planning process has coincided with a very important development. In December of 2006 the Green Gold Inn, home to Dorothy’s Place Hospitality Center, faced the expiration of the Conditional Use Permit that allows for the legal use of the building as a day shelter and soup kitchen. Since the founding of the SDCB, questions regarding the extension of the Green Gold Inn Use Permit and the long-term presence of homeless services on Soledad Street have been of paramount importance. As the planning process continues it will be vital for the group to form consensus over the future of these facilities and their role in a revitalized community. At the current junction the SDCB is
considering the authorization of a study on the feasibility of relocating homeless services to another part of town.

In the hope of providing resources for an informed decision, this research applies a New Urban Political Economy perspective to identify factors contributing to the failure to find a permanent location for these facilities. In particular, this research focuses on the role of the Downtown Social Service Board as the facilitating organization in the establishment and attempted relocation of services on, and from, Soledad Street. With that stated the following is a basic description of the layout of this report.

First, a review of the scholarly literature illustrates elements of the theoretical framework being applied in this study. The primary perspective is one of New Urban Political Economy. Contextually situating this theoretical lens is a discussion of contemporary perspectives on homelessness and the “Not In My Backyard” syndrome. The purpose of this review is to build a useful analytical framework through with to identify factors relevant to the stated research question.

Second, the reader will find a description of the research methodology utilized in this study. Qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews with persons involved in the efforts of the Downtown Social Service Board, and through qualitative analysis of public records regarding that organization. For the purposes of analyzing theoretical relationships, a concurrent nested strategy is utilized for the integration of quantitative, content analysis data into a largely qualitative analysis. The third section presents the results of this methodology.

The presentation of the results is divided into two sections, a historical analysis and the statistical outputs from the Content Analysis. The historical analysis of events leading to the current controversy is presented first. The second section illustrates and discusses some unique statistical information produced through the content analysis of the public records.

A section of conclusions discusses the significance of the results in relation to the research question. This is achieved by weaving together elements of the qualitative and quantitative analysis to draw conclusions about the relationship between Downtown redevelopment, the DSSB, and Soledad Street homeless services. In summation, I also
discuss some contributions, and recommendations of this study, to include areas for further work.

**Literature Review**

This discussion illustrates elements of the theoretical framework being applied in this study. The primary perspective is one of New Urban Political Economy. To situate this theoretical lens within the current context I have added a discussion regarding contemporary perspectives on homelessness and the “Not In My Backyard” syndrome. The purpose of this review is to build a useful analytical framework through with to identify factors relevant to the stated research question.

**New Urban Political Economy**

Historically, urban development theory has been dominated by the Chicago School of thought, focusing on an ecological perspective of urban space relations. In the social Darwinism of place, the “invisible hand” dictates the geographic distribution of land uses and human populations to naturally maximize land use values and economic/social productivity (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Holupka and Shlay, 1993; Logan, 1978; Molotch, 1990). The inequality and stratification of land uses and urban populations are perceived as “natural, system-maintaining consequences of differentiation” (Logan, 1978) representing the most efficient division of the labor and population hierarchy:

In the first place, inequality is an inevitable accompaniment of functional differentiation. Certain functions are by their nature more influential than others; they are strategically placed in the division of labor and thus impinge directly upon a larger number of other functions...Secondly, mutual supplementation through functional differentiation necessitates a centralization of control. To insure the regular operation of the system there must be a sufficient governing and coordinating power vested in some one function (Halway, 1950, pp. 221).
The perspective of New Urban Political Economy however, is rooted in the Marxist theories of David Harvey (1973) and Castells (1976). This perspective stresses that inequality and stratification are not natural, but the result of inter-locational conflicts of land based elites to affect the growth process in order to create and maintain inequalities among places to their own advantage. Inter-spatial competition acts to reinforce existing elements of socio-economic stratification caused by the maintenance of initial economic advantages through their translation into political power (Logan, 1978).

Molotch (1976) argues that “once people of the metropolis relate themselves to a certain area, their fortunes and futures become dependent upon the fate of the geographical unit to which they have become attached” (quoted in Logan, 1978, pp. 408). In as much as the characteristics attributable to place are defined by local economic and political relationships with other areas, people are motivated to influence the development process through political action in order to maintain or improve their relative position in the socio-economic stratification of place (Logan, 1978; Molotch, 1976; Halupka and Shlay, 1993). The city is, in essence, a growth machine (Molotch, 1976), and its major actors are competing growth coalitions comprised of specific local and institutional actors with shared networks, competing for influence in local development outcomes.

The role of politics and agency in shaping place was given its clearest contemporary expression with the recognition of the city as a “growth machine” by Harvey Molotch in 1976. A growth machine perspective argues that city development outcomes are dictated by the coordinated actions of growth coalitions who consciously work to manipulate the urban landscape. An aggregation of specific local actors and institutions with land-use and growth interests, the coalition is necessarily undemocratic in its need to remain unaccountable while utilizing symbolic politics to legitimize its authority and propagate the “goodness of growth” (Halupka and Shlay, 1993). This lack of democracy and accountability ultimately culminates in the benefits of development becoming highly skewed. The promises of economic spillover from big development projects act to disperse responsibility for the costs of economic growth
among the wide majority of the urban population while concentrating the majority of tangible benefits in newly redeveloped downtowns.

Redevelopment within this context is a very specific process. The term is narrowly defined as it relates to California Community Redevelopment Law. Put forth in the California Health and Safety Code, beginning with section 33000 et seq., this legislation authorizes local governmental bodies such as the city council or board of supervisors to establish a redevelopment agency. This agency reports to its establishing body and is charged with the creation of redevelopment plans that lay out the legal framework to implement revitalization projects with the goal of revitalizing blighted areas (California Redevelopment Association, 2006). Revitalization, conversely, is defined as the socio-economic reinvestment in blighted communities. This term can be, and is often, associated with redevelopment.

Blighted areas are defined as those which “constitute either physical, social, or economic liabilities requiring redevelopment in the interest of the health, safety, and general welfare of the people of the community and the state” (Carlson, W., Elliott, A. and Seifel, E., 2002). More simply they are those which have suffered from long term social and economic disinvestment, resulting in vacant lots, degraded facades, little or no economic activity, increased crime, and social distress.

Because of the complexity of the redevelopment process, such efforts are beyond the reach of most private sector entities. Consequently, the redevelopment agency has become a powerful resource in the reshaping of California’s urban landscape through the intervention of local governments in the urban economic/development process. Redevelopment resources are naturally quite valuable, both in respect to the possible financial gain they can induce, and also in their relative scarcity. The agency, along with local government, therefore, becomes a venue for inter-locational competition as the distributor of development resources.

The key to understanding the role of homeless services in this type of inter-locational conflict is to understand the possibility of homeless services becoming valued (or “being used”) as a resource for continued economic growth, and not necessarily for the benefit of the homeless population. This connection can be best described as a function of the
“Not In My Backyard” syndrome – due to individualistic perspectives on homelessness and a negative externality perceived by the community on the homeless population.

Contemporary Perspective on Homelessness

The primary public and academic perspectives on the causes and nature of homelessness can generally be categorized into three perspectives focusing on the individualistic, structural, and political economic causes of homelessness (Shlay and Rossi, 1992; Wright, 2000; Lee, Jones, and Lewis, 1990; Moore, Sink, and Hoban-Moore, 1988, Quigley, Raphael, and Smolensky, 2001; Dear and Wolch, 1987). The individualistic approach stresses personal deficits such as laziness, immorality, alcohol and drug abuse, physical disabilities, and mental illness as causes for the inability to acquire and/or the loss of housing (Bahr, 1973; Huber and Form, 1973; for review see Kluegel and Smith, 1981). Those of the structural perspective focus on issues such as the lack of affordable housing, livable wage, declining welfare services, and a “variety of complex social system dislocations” (Wright, Rubin, and Devine, 1998, pp. 4) in their explanation of homelessness while offering the criticism that the individualistic approach “blames the victim” (Milburn and Watts, 1986; Hoch, 1986; Swanstrom 1989, Shlay and Rossi, 1992).

A more contemporary political economic perspective suggests that both individual and social-structural elements contribute to the transitions of people in and out of homelessness. Wright (2000) suggests that structuralist elements such as “the decline in average real wages, the reduction in welfare services, and the inability to secure adequate housing are part of a national crisis of profitability and productivity that emerged in the 1970s” (pp. 33). These elements are combined with a breakdown in social networks and the individual’s ability to cope. In so far as wages were driven down, “families had to work harder and longer to stay ahead, increasing family stress and fraying fragile social networks” (Wright, 2000, pp. 33). Within this perspective mental illness is seen both as a cause of homelessness and one of its many symptoms (Shlay and Rossi, 1992; Wright, 2000; Lee, Jones, and Lewis, 1990; Moore, Sink, and Hoban-Moore, 1988, Quigley, Raphael, and Smolensky, 2001; Dear and Wolch, 1987, Kluegel and Smith, 1981).
These varying perspectives on homelessness are of particular importance to this discussion because they impact our common willingness to accept the homeless community and their accompanying service facilities in our neighborhoods, as will be discussed in more depth in the following section. Previous research suggests that older, white, males, of income levels higher than $50,000 per year, possess the highest statistical likelihood to view the homeless from an individualistic perspective (Gallup Report, 1985; Huber and Form, 1973; Kluegel and Smith, 1981; Oropesa, 1986; Lee, Jones, and Lewis, 1990). This same group also has the highest propensity of pursuing exclusionary tactics toward homeless populations (Tringo, 1970; Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1993).

The NIMBY Syndrome

Over the past few decades the professional literature and mass media have shown increasing coverage of homeless and human service facilities becoming the targets of exclusionary practices known as the “Not in My Backyard” Syndrome or NIMBYism. NIMBYism is most frequently defined as a selfish desire of neighborhood residents and business owners to protect their turf or neighborhood from “toxic” and undesirable facilities (Dear, 1992; Pendall, 1999; Knox and Thornton, 2002). This type of community opposition has in many cases led to the abandonment of project proposals, the closing of recently established facilities, the stigmatization and marginalization of those who society has labeled “nonproductive”, and the concentration of society’s undesirables into service dependent ghettos (Piat, 2000; Solomon, 1983; Dear and Takahashi, 1997; Dear and Wolch, 1987). “At the very least, public opposition results in relationships between the community and the facility which are strained, with a knock on effect on the well being and social integration of the clients who use the facility” (Cowan, 2003, pp. 33).

Simply put, NIMBYist opposition is caused by the introduction or proposed introduction of facilities which carry a perceived threat of negative externality towards the characteristics which have caused persons to locate in a given neighborhood. These perceptions are deeply related by proxy to the perceived characteristics of the proposed facilities and their clients (Dear, 1992; Dear and Gleeson, 1991; Dear and Takahashi,
Community responses to the introduction of human service facilities for all levels of acceptability are thought to hinge on four main factors related to the way in which facilities and client populations may impact the characteristics of the community. The first is client characteristics based on the hierarchy of acceptability stated above. The second relates to the nature of the human service facility, its location, architectural design, etc. The third is the structure of the host community. Higher income residential areas, as would be expected, are thought to be the most exclusive. Lower income and semi-industrial areas are generally more accepting. Finally, there are also other programmatic considerations such as client supervision and program staffing that can impact the ways in which the clients interact with the community (Dear, 1992; Dear and Taylor, 1982; Glass, 1989; Weber, 1978).

The recognition of these factors is important to this discussion because they demonstrate the role homeless services can play in mediating the perceived negative impacts of the homeless community on any given neighborhood. Similarly, the hierarchy
of preference provides clues to why the homeless are thought incompatible with revitalized – or redeveloped – communities, and thus, subject to exclusionary tactics.

**Integrative Summary (excellent effort!).**

The accumulation of literature presented above constitutes the theoretical perspective utilized in the analytical aspects of this research. Ultimately it is perceived that the three common perspectives on the nature of homelessness largely impact an individual’s likelihood to pursue NIMBYist tactics towards homeless populations and their associated service facilities. NIMBYism results in interspatial conflicts because exclusionary tactics require the existence of “someone else’s backyard”. It is in this way that new urban political economy can help us understand the relationship between homeless services and redevelopment. Although redevelopment is defined specifically by California State law, the presence of the homeless may become defined as a barrier to economic growth and redevelopment. The establishment and future relocation of homeless services may, therefore, become defined as a resource for redevelopment and the economic growth process (again, not necessarily for the long-term benefits of the homeless population). Within the particular context of this research, a perspective such as this provides a unique structure or framework within which the data may be analyzed. This is necessary because it allows the researcher to approach the data, ready for analysis. Before analysis can take place, however, the data must be collected and prepared.

**Methodology**

To provide data on a real world context, to which the above perspective can be applied, the following Methodology has been pursued. This section states the rationale used in the choice of procedures for the collection and management of data. First, the sampling method and procedures are explained for both sets of qualitative samples. Next, an overview of the concurrent nested strategy for data analysis is given with a description of the procedures for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Finally, some of the
practical limitations associated with this methodology are discussed in relation to the analysis of the data.

**Sampling Method and Procedures**

There are two primary data sources utilized in this study: 1) Meeting Minutes and other public records associated with the DSSB and 2) individuals personally involved with the DSSB. Both data samples were compiled from convenient sources and thus cannot be considered complete. The public records sample was compiled from those available at the Salinas Redevelopment Agency and includes meeting minutes, correspondence, reports, etc., referencing the overall historical progression of the Board and/or the relocation and establishment of homeless services. A sample of prospective interviewees representing the various stakeholders involved with the DSSB was developed from the public records. The sample has been purposefully chosen to make use of the experience of participants as representative stakeholders to the DSSB and in matters concerning the establishment of homeless services on Soledad Street. Identified stakeholder groups include local business, Salinas City government, Monterey County government, social service providers, property owners/residents, and the street community. The only criterion for inclusion or exclusion of participants is their participation on, or collaboration with, the Downtown Social Service Board. Ultimately six participants were scheduled for interview; two representing Salinas City government, one representing local business, two representing social service providers, and one representing property owners/residents.

The original intent was to interview one individual from each relevant stakeholder group. Unfortunately, it was not possible to contact any individuals who had represented Monterey County government, effectively excluding them from participation. Also, no members of the street community could be identified as having participated on the DSSB and thus have been excluded from qualitative interview. A second participant representing the social service providers was contacted in order to help explain an important event identified in the public records (in which one of the service providers, Sun Street Centers, opposed the relocation of homeless services near their facility). Also, a second participant
from Salinas City Government was interviewed in order to gain from their particular insight into redevelopment efforts in the Chinatown area.

The Concurrent Nested Strategy for Data Analysis

“The concurrent nested model can be identified by its use of one data collection phase, during which both quantitative and qualitative data are collected simultaneously. Unlike the traditional triangulation model, a nested approach has a predominant method that guides the project. Given less priority, the method (quantitative or qualitative) is embedded, or nested, within the predominant method...this model is used so that a researcher can gain broader perspectives as a result of using the different methods as opposed to using the predominant method alone” (Creswell, 2003).

This study utilizes two very distinct methods of data analysis. The primary method is the qualitative coding of interview transcripts and public records. Each document or transcript is reviewed line by line, identifying historical turning points and analytical themes which are then documented as memos using relevant quotations. Some of the historical points documented in this study are the creation of the DSSB, the relocation of the Swinging Door to Soledad Street, and the closure of the Swinging Door program. Some analytical themes include for example, rationales for relocation and the dispersion of funding responsibilities.

Interviews lasted between forty five and ninety minutes. They were audio-taped and transcribed to aid in documentation. This lends greater accuracy in quoting the views of participants. Participants were apprised of all intended uses of the information they provided, offered the opportunity to be assigned a pseudonym, and informed of their right to drop out at any time. If assigned a pseudonym, all description would have been kept at a general level so that they would not be specifically identified and any responses which could not be successfully described in general would be excluded from the write-up and presentation. However, no participants have chosen this option and may therefore be identified by name and/or affiliation.
The secondary method is known as content analysis and is embedded as supplemental material in the overall qualitative research design. This method allows for statistical analysis of qualitative data by creating a second, quantitative data set. This is accomplished by identifying themes, patterns, and trends within the qualitative review that are then counted, denoting their relative frequency. Theoretical Concepts such as inter-locational conflict and NIMBYism were used to help identify many of these key trends, relating to homeless services and downtown redevelopment.

Within the context of this research, content analysis is being used to analyze the frequency of various rationales for relocating homeless services to and from the Soledad Street area, in the hope of understanding the DSSB’s primary intentions, as well as other community dynamics resulting in the current controversy. Rationales for relocation are defined as reasons for pursuing the relocation of homeless services to, or from, Soledad Street. The categories used for content analysis are:

1) **NIMBYism**: defined as a perceived negative externality on the community; to include an expressed, yet unspecific, incompatibility of the homeless or “street people” with redevelopment or revitalization.

2) **Cost/Benefit Accounting**: defined as considerations of financial and quality of life implications of relocation (e.g. the costs of relocation, the safety of local children, etc.)

3) **Symbolic Politics**: defined as an emblematic gesture or declaration, masking or accompanying an alternative agenda

4) **Other**: defined as any stated rationale which does not conform to the above categories.

Of particular note is the difficulty in creating mutually exclusive definitions of the above categories. NIMBYism and Cost/Benefit Accounting are by nature very interrelated. NIMBYism pertains to a perceived negative externality which may be manifest in concerns
of safety impacts or impacts on local business. For the purposes of this study NIMBYism and Cost/Benefit Accounting have been distinguished by the depth and intensity of their expression. A reference or rationale has been deemed to be NIMBYistic if it expresses merely the incompatibility of the homeless population with a given area, without the statement of the quantifiable impacts.

Using two different types of data allows the researcher to gain unique perspectives which would not be available from only one data source. The concurrent nested strategy also facilitates the analysis of data across multiple levels of analysis (Morse, 1991). For example the historical and the theoretical are used in this study. Other advantages include the ability to collect both qualitative and quantitative data in a single phase. Although a multi stage methodology could have benefited this research, the single phase strategy makes it feasible in light of various time constraints.

Limitations of the Method

There are many obstacles in pursuing this goal. For one, there has been no previous study of this particular case from which to establish an elementary history. Second, the documents available in the public archives are incomplete, offering only a partial record. The record is comprised mostly of meeting minutes that, by their nature, are only a summery of what was discussed, and lack very much detail. Interviews with involved persons were used to fill in details unavailable in the public records. The historical nature of the events being discussed means the recollections of participants may not be totally reliable. Also, as is understandable with interview research, the information provided by different participants varies based on their individual perspectives. This presents a particular challenge to the analysis of interview data as well as an opportunity to draw unique insight from cases in which interviewees differ and concur with one another.

The main problem found in the implementation of this methodology - outside of the basic limitations such as time, access to materials, and the incompleteness of the data – was the necessarily subjective interpretation of historical events and community dynamics, and resolving discrepancies between the different types of data (contemporary interview vs. historical records for example). There is little guidance for this found in the
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scholarly literature and it is left up to the researcher to make the critical decisions relative to the integration of the data into the final analysis. A concurrent nested approach may result in unequal evidence being presented from each of the data types. This may be natural however, since the strategy intentionally emphasizes a particular data type (Creswell, 2003).

**Results**

The following section presents the results of the above outlined research process. A historical review is presented first, covering the four main phases of DSSB involvement in the establishment of homeless services on Soledad Street, namely: 1) the creation of the Swinging Door and the DSSB; 2) relocation of the Swinging Door to Soledad Street; 3) the attempted relocation of services to Sun Street; and, 4) the creation of the Wheel of Hope. The second section describes the results of the content analysis of public records and some statistical outputs derived from that procedure.

**Historical Analysis**

**Creation of the Swinging Door and the DSSB (1973-1982)**

The History of the Swinging Door program and services in the central city of Salinas begins in the early 1970’s. Sun Street Centers, an alcohol and drug rehabilitation facility established in 1968, had received a grant from the California Council on Criminal Justice to reduce arrests for public intoxication (penal code 647 f). Martin Dodd, former Executive Director of Sun Street Centers, explains the creation of the Swinging Door:

In 1973, the Center City Authority, eager to revitalize the 100 and 200 blocks [of Main Street], asked Sun Street to propose a plan to remove residual drunks from the area. I advised them that the men drank, socialized, and loitered on the street because they had no other place to be. Hotels would not allow guests in the rooms, they could not be in a restaurant or bar without purchasing, and if they went to a park, people
feared them and called the cops. I suggested an “indoor park” where they could gather, and a farm/housing program outside of town.

I arranged a meeting between street people and the City Council. The outcome was funding of a drop-in center (the Swinging Door) that opened on the southwest corner of Pajaro and Market Streets in 1974, funded by the City (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).

The stated purpose of the program throughout its history was to draw the “street people”, as they were commonly called, off of the streets and away from the store fronts and alcoves in Downtown (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006; Saunders Interview, November 6, 2006). This theme of removal is prevalent throughout the history of the program and seems to derive from NIMBYist perceptions of downtown merchants regarding the impacts of homeless on the business atmosphere.

But the Swinging Door also provided a number of ancillary services. It was a place where people could wash their clothes, take a shower, receive phone calls and mail, and get out of the weather. As long as they weren’t violent, didn’t drink, and weren’t doing drugs, they could stay there all night (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).

The founding of the Swinging Door directly corresponds with the establishment of the Salinas Central City Planning and Revitalization Program, suggesting an association between services and urban development. The 1973 Program Study investigates the skid row phenomenon and recommends short, intermediate and long term approaches “to mitigate the impacts of the skid row on the Main Street retail area…expand the support for the existing institutions on Skid Row which are involved in rehabilitation efforts…[and] reduce the long range costs to the various public agencies which are involved in Skid Row” (City of Salinas, 1973). Among the recommendations are the strict regulation of certain business types (such as bars and card rooms), the pursuit of physical improvements to make the area “undesirable to the undesirables”, the continued funding of alcoholic rehabilitation programs (namely Sun Street Centers), the assisted relocation of the Victory Mission, and the creation of a “Downtown Drop-in Center” (City of Salinas, 1973). The recommendations hinge on the idea that continuation of skid
row activities would have a negative impact on the development of a redeveloped business district.

In 1979, a professional evaluation by the County of Monterey concluded that the Swinging Door program was meeting its intended use:

> Nearly three quarters of the businesses in the area and the affected social service agency staff indicated that the Center was effective in providing a gathering place off the street. (Multi-Agency Task Force, 1981).

The evaluation provided evidence that the existence of the Swinging Door program financially benefited the county hospital, and to a somewhat lesser degree, the county social services and public health nurses. Before the Swinging Door the Department of Public Health had five public health nurses to track down tuberculosis cases. After the establishment of the Swinging Door they were cut to one. The program had provided an ancillary service to the County Department of Public Health by creating a major gathering place for at risk populations (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).

The fact that it [the Swinging Door] provided such a valuable social service and reduced costs to other agencies prompted Monterey County to participate in funding the Center’s operation. The total budget in FY 1980-81 was approximately $85,000, shared 20% County of Monterey, 40% Salinas Urban Renewal Agency and 40% City of Salinas (Multi-Agency Task Force, 1981).

In 1980 a Multi-Agency Task Force was created to consider the needs of the “street people” and the Swinging Door program. Composed of City, County, and business representatives, it ultimately recommended a combination drop-in center and residential facility to address the long term issues of homelessness in Downtown. More importantly from a historical perspective is the recommendation that a Joint Powers Agreement be created to ensure commitment, financial and otherwise, from Monterey County and the City of Salinas. The long term objective was “…to make better use of funds which [were]
already available, not to create a demand for additional funds” (Multi-Agency Task Force, 1981). The future location of the recommended facilities was also expressed as vital to their future success, citing a need for further research.

Two years later, in 1982, the recommendations of the Task Force were brought into practice with the creation of the Downtown Salinas Social Service Center Board (The name was changed to Downtown Social Service Board in 1984). A Joint Powers Agreement by City Council Resolution, it was composed of five standing members and three alternates. Two standing members and one alternate were appointed from both the City of Salinas and the County of Monterey. One standing member and one alternate were appointed by the Oldtown Salinas Association representing Downtown business interests (Salinas City Council, 1982).

In 1984 the Board actively pursued the addition of two new board members to allow for representation by the “greater community at large”. This began the direct participation of the Salinas Buddhist Temple, the Franciscan Workers, and other organizations, on the DSSB (Department of Housing and Redevelopment, February 25, 1985). The addition of new members somewhat mitigated the general lack of democracy present within the DSSB via the original Joint Powers Agreement. The change however, seems prompted necessity rather than an ethic of inclusively.

The intended purpose of the Joint Powers Agreement was:

…to establish a Joint Powers Board through which available resource can be organized and focused to study and evaluate the special needs of people in downtown Salinas and to plan, design, establish, and operate such services, programs, or facilities as may be necessary and appropriate to improve the social environment of the downtown Salinas area (Salinas City Council, 1982).

When specifically asked about the real nature and purpose of the DSSB, four of the six interviewees responded that:
It was basically a group of Downtown interests, wanting to do something to make sure that the homeless issues stay out of Downtown...The merchant body and property owner groups, for fairly good reasons, were concerned about the negative impact of the homeless community and the affiliate drugs, you know, the folks who use the homeless community as a shield to sell and buy drugs, was a deterrent to the economic vitality of Downtown. So they wanted to do everything they could to get that stuff north of Market (Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006).

Recall the association between NIMBYism toward the homeless and the interlocational conflict it can produce. This statement provides a perfect example of how the DSSB has been a function of this relationship, driven by the NIMBYism of downtown, but still struggling to make a meaningful impact. This group, contrary to its title, was composed of downtown redevelopment interests brought together as a growth coalition, to support the redevelopment process.

Robert Smith, although concurring with the assessment of Mr. Bussard, also described the DSSB in a more human light:

Just some really, really wonderful people who, uh. Even in their own minds and hearts were wrestling with several realities all at the same time. Wanting redevelopment but being challenged by their ideals and ethics and community morals… (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006).

**Relocating to Soledad Street (1984-1987)**

Soledad Street prior to the arrival of the Swinging Door was a vibrant place. Card rooms, bars, hotels, restaurants, were all part of the social and economic vitality of the old Chinatown. In the 1970’s, during the same wave of public policy adjustment that created the Swinging Door, the City began to shut down the various bars that made up most of the area’s commerce. By 1984 much of the economic and social activity had
subsided. What was left were a few residual businesses/hotels, vacant lots, “prostitution and drugs” (Saunders Interview, November 6, 2006).

The Swinging Door prior to its relocation had occupied two different locations in the Downtown. Originally established in the mid-100 block of Pajaro Street, the facility was moved when a fire broke out in the lower level where the Swinging Door operated (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006). The fire forced Sun Street Centers to reestablish the facility a few doors down, adjacent to the old Plaza Hotel, in the American Meat Market building on the Corner of Pajaro and Market (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006).

The evidence in the public record documenting why the Swinging Door was relocated from Downtown is thin. The majority of references from the period cite some practical aspect of the relocation process, such as the identification of relocation sites, the establishment of a lease, and the appeal of a conditional use permit. One reference, however, does report that the building (presumably at the corner of Pajaro and Market) had been sold (Downtown Salinas Social Service Center Board, January 17, 1985). Supporting this explanation, the Swinging Door did in fact receive an official notice to terminate tenancy on October 31, 1985 (R. C. Taylor, personal communication, July 24, 1985). The reasons for the issuance of this notice are unclear.

The interviews provide a different perspective of the relocation to Soledad Street. Four of the six interviewees agreed that “the whole point of the relocation from…Market and Pajaro Street, to Soledad Street was an attempt to concentrate the homeless in one particular area…so that the Downtown area could have one less hurdle to cross, so they could renovate” (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006). This reinforces the perceived association between redevelopment and the inter-locational conflicts fostered by NIMBYism; as well as the function of the Swinging Door (and its relocation) as a resource for continued development in Downtown.

When asking why Soledad Street became the focus of the relocation effort, interview responses seem to suggest the mere convenience of the location. At the time the Salvation Army occupied the old Republic Hotel (also known as the Lewis Hotel) on Soledad Street. There were vacant buildings. It was an area already frequented by the homeless population. The Victory Mission men’s shelter was located there, and the Franciscan Workers were, at the time, feeding lunch on a vacant lot across the street from the
Republic Hotel (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006; Saunders Interview, November 6, 2006). Despite the consideration of at least six different properties in the central city area the relative convenience afforded by the above characteristics meant that 47 Soledad Street was to become the new location for the Swinging Door (Saunders Interview, November 6, 2006).

The lease of the Old Republic Hotel was officially established in September 1984, sharing space with the Salvation Army’s Family Shelter that occupied the upper floor (Downtown Social Service Board, April 3, 1986). The facility did not open, however, until March 4, 1986 (Downtown Social Service Board, March 6, 1986). The main reasons for the delay are serious plumbing and renovation issues with the building itself, and a denial by the Planning Commission of the Conditional Use Permit (CUP 84-40) that would have allowed the legal establishment of a homeless service facility at that location. The denial was seemingly the result of community opposition to the relocation, represented primarily by the Salinas Buddhist Temple.

The Temple is one of the major Japanese cultural centers in Monterey County and had for decades “tolerated the City’s turning its back on the [Chinatown] neighborhood” (Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006). In the past, the Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino communities who occupied the area had been forced to cope with “an alleged effort on the part of law enforcement to force these kinds of problems from wherever they were bothering property owners and residents, to go to Chinatown…” (Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006). In 1984, the Salinas Buddhist Temple was planning a $1,263,000 expansion of their facilities, to include a multi-purpose center and gymnasium (Takemura, Yamaguchi, and Hirasuna, 1984). When the relocation of the Swinging Door came before the planning commission the Asian community responded, feeling relocation was dumping the Downtown’s problem on them (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006), just as they began to invest. Therefore, NIMBYism from the Chinatown community was sparked somewhat by the redevelopment in Downtown that was push the homeless across the tracks. The fear was that the Swinging Door, by attracting homeless from Downtown, would exacerbate problems of prostitution, public defecation, etc., that were already present in the neighborhood.
Considering the effectiveness of services:

…the Buddhist Temple was [also] saying hey wait, it’s already a blighted area. It’s the blighted area in the City of Salinas. There are drugs and prostitution, and your going to move it there? How are you going to help the homeless? That was the thing I always stood on. Hey, you know, do you take your child, who wants candy all the time, and put them in front of the candy jar… (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006).

On November 15, 1984 the DSSB voted unanimously to file an appeal to the Planning Commission (Downtown Salinas Social Service Center Board, November 15, 1984). The homeless service use of the Republic Hotel was formally established in July 1985, when the DSSB appeal was approved. The conditions of the approval prescribe a two-year time limit and the creation of an advisory committee to look into possible adverse effects of the Swinging Door on the surrounding neighborhood. Although reasons for the approval are not stated in the public record the interviews provide some insight. Redevelopment of Downtown seems to have taken priority for the City Council, over the issues of other areas (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006). Douglas Iwamoto explained that:

The business association was more powerful than the members of the Church or Soledad Street (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006).

Accompanying this type of power differential and inter-locational conflict between the Downtown and Chinatown, you can see an element of apathy by the Asian community, possibly stemming from the years of disenfranchisement by the City.

…it wasn’t so much that the Church didn’t have the backing, it’s that the property owners around Soledad Street for a century, you can say, never really gave a dang about the town or its citizens. Otherwise the property owners would have taken that part of town and fixed it up. But they didn’t
care. They want the City to do something about it (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006).

In addition to this we see a pressure on the Temple to live up to the Buddhist ideologies of compassion:

I think there was quite a bit of dispute within the Board of Directors within the Buddhist Church as to how they were going to handle it. And I do remember there was quite a bit of flack for the Church not having sympathy for the homeless. I think somebody was successful in making them feel like they were being bad, that they had no sympathy for the plight of the homeless. And I believe that’s what kind of got them going in the direction of, well, if we can’t oppose it completely, let’s be involved in the process and try and make it as good as we can (Saunders Interview, November 6, 2006).

The key to the relocation, however, seems to be a promise, made by the City, that the relocation would be temporary. First mentioned when CUP 84-40 was denied, the DSSB expressed plans in January 1985 for a three year temporary relocation of the Swinging Door to the Republic Hotel. Interview results show this promise to be largely political (the actual level at which the DSSB intended to follow through on the promise cannot be reliably ascertained). Seemingly to help the DSSB “make the leap” (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006), the promise allowed the Temple to remain visibly compassionate toward the homeless population. It allowed the Downtown redevelopment area to rid itself of a troubled population and it offered an opportunity for service providers to collaborate their provision of services in a conveniently concentrated geographical area.

The promise did, quite expectedly, have consequences. Some of which are still just coming to be realized by those currently involved. The most obvious is that the City, and the Salinas Redevelopment Agency in particular, were obliged to pursue relocation of the Swinging Door to a permanent site “outside the Soledad Street sphere of Influence”.
At the time this CUP [84-40] was approved, the Downtown Social Service Board (DSSB), Center City Authority and City Staff were directed to look for a permanent site for the Swinging Door and an advisory committee was established to monitor the Swinging Door’s operation on Soledad Street and to assist in the search for a permanent location. Concurrent with the Swinging Door’s relocation, direction was given to begin work on a specific redevelopment plan/strategy for the Soledad Street Phase II Area (Don Lauritson, August, 19, 1987).

The Phase II Action Strategy outlines redevelopment plans for the Soledad Street area as the second phase of the Central City Redevelopment Project – of which the Downtown is the first phase. It discusses two scenarios for the provision of homeless services:

The first alternative is to relocate the homeless services to Sun Street, at a possible cost of $1.2 to $1.7 million. The second alternative is to retain these services on Soledad Street, using the monies that would have gone to relocation to meet the needs of the homeless and to revitalize the neighborhood (City of Salinas Department of Community Development, 1987).

The DSSB seems to have viewed the second option as the most appealing and between 1987 and 1991 pursued the acquisition of property at the Corner of Soledad and Lake Streets for the construction of a permanent facility. It was, however, a local non-profit organization, Housing for the Homeless, Inc., that became the primary mover and the DSSB seems to have sat back to pursue other issues, content with having removed the homeless from Downtown. From a Urban Political Economy perspective it seems that the primary interest of the DSSB as a growth coalition had been satisfied, that is, the removal of homeless from Downtown).
Soledad and Lake Streets (1990-1991)

Housing for the Homeless, Inc. had begun working with the DSSB during the relocation to Soledad Street and was involved in searching for alternative locations. Founded by Joe Stave of the Abramson, Church, and Stave law practice, the group had committed to help provide constructive solutions to the issues of homelessness in central Salinas. In working with the DSSB they offered their organization as an alternative funding source for homeless services, and established raising funds to facilitate the relocation of the Swinging Door as a high priority (Downtown Social Service Board, March 5, 1987). One of their major contributions was the $150,000 acquisition (paid by the City) of property at the corner of Soledad Street and Lake Streets (Stave Personal Communication, September 26, 1990). Evolving just prior to the Sun Street relocation effort, the plan included architectural designs for a permanent facility and the consideration of temporary portable housing units. According to Martin Dodd:

…this whole thing was a bureaucratic plan to buy time. The 1989 earthquake resulted in a City push to bring all unreinforced masonry buildings up to code. The [Republic] Hotel was condemned. A local architect offered his services to design a new building for the Swinging Door and Dorothy’s Place…The Temple opposed the move from one corner of Soledad Street to the other. It was a grand square dance. The plans were drawn. There was no funding… [the City] had promised the Temple that no permanent site would be built in Chinatown (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).

Ultimately, the Salinas City Council responded to political pressure for the DSSB to fulfill their promises and motioned to:

…accept staff recommendations that a new location be explored for the Swinging Door outside of the Soledad Street area with a return report to the Council with specific recommendations within 120 days. She added
that within the 120 days the Redevelopment Department meet with the Soledad Street area property owners, business owners, and service providers to review the existing Phase II Redevelopment Plan. She [Councilmember Meurer] asked that at the end of the 120 days, in addition to the recommendation of a permanent location for the Swinging Door, that an additional plan be presented for implementation of the proposals contained in the Phase II Redevelopment Plan (Salinas Redevelopment Agency, December 3, 1991).

With City Council pressure such as this, the DSSB could no longer ignore their promises of relocation and the redevelopment of Chinatown. Their response was to seriously pursue the acquisition and rehabilitation of two labor camp locations on Sun Street, just two blocks from the Republic Hotel. Soledad Street, for the time being, was no longer possible as the location for homeless services in Central Salinas.

**Sun Street Relocation Attempt (Peaking in 1991-1992)**

The concept of relocating homeless services to a labor camp location has shown a consistent presence in the records since 1984. Labor camps, for those who are unaware of the concept, are group-housing complexes designed to house large numbers of seasonal agricultural workers. The first reference occurs in the public record on January 6, 1984 by Foster Clark, a long time resident of Salinas (Downtown Salinas Social Service Center Board, January 26, 2006). By 1987 the DSSB had conducted site reviews and preliminary relocation cost estimates for three labor camp locations on Sun Street, approximately two blocks from Chinatown.

Despite in depth plans for relocating to Sun Street, the DSSB seems to be split at times in their support. On February 5, 1987 for example, the minutes of the DSSB report that “the DSSB is still strongly opposed to the relocation of the Swinging Door facility and feel that the Soledad Street location is still the prime site for these facilities”. No reasons are given for holding this position. Interestingly, one month later we find that a DSSB subcommittee created to address the relocation of the Swinging door declared that their
“ideal facility would involve purchase of the majority of property on Sun Street” (Downtown Social Service Board, March 5, 1987). Notice the inconsistency within the Board as to their position regarding Sun Street. This suggests the DSSB may not have been fully committed to the permanent relocation of services. Additionally, as Doug Iwamoto puts it, “you never had the business association from Main Street jumping on board to really push it that way” (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006). Thus it seems the DSSB and the Downtown business interests that they once represented felt content with services being located in Chinatown. It raises the question whether the Sun Street relocation was truly in the interest of better service provision, the future redevelopment of Chinatown, or simply because of political pressure as a consequence of the promises made years earlier? The answers to these questions have not yet been uncovered.

Sun Street was seen as a location removed from the drugs and prostitution of Soledad Street that was near enough to the Downtown to meet the service and entertainment needs of the homeless community (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006; Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006). The presence of the labor camps meant the area was already home to a migrant population, with space enough to incorporate and expand services:

We thought it would be a good idea to move all services to one area, and it would take care of both the men and women, and, if children were homeless. [It would] try to take care of them all in one place; instead of having them walk around, because they had no cars. The idea was to have a one stop shop…Wal-Mart, little campus type” (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006).

In order to consolidate and expand it was thought necessary to relocate services together, thus including the Victory Mission and Dorothy’s Soup Kitchen in relocation plans (Don Lauritson, August 19, 1987). This was in accord with the Central City Planning and Revitalization Program Study that calls for the “assisted relocation of the Victory Mission” (Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd, 1973), and the Phase II Action Strategy discussing the relocation of all Soledad Street homeless services in the event that redevelopment begin in Chinatown (Department of Community Development, 1987).
The hope was to have an emergency shelter providing services and beds for extended stays, with the opportunity to transition into the drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs at Sun Street Centers, located down the block (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006). The site worked because, as Larry Bussard puts it:

We had facilities that had both a kitchen, as it were, a feeding area, as it were, and a sleeping area, as it were. It made some sense to see if you could take those and convert them into a homeless shelter that has all those kinds of needs. We took a very long and hard (and fairly expensive) look. We actually had architects…look at those labor camps…I went out with the architects with the tape measurer, measured stuff and the whole drill, figuring out how to go about bringing the facilities up to code…And we had significant cooperation from property owners. They were willing to make a sale to us on those properties and we were prepared to do that (Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006).

Plans developed, and in 1991 produced official site plans (see Appendix A for details) at an expected cost ranging from $1.2 to $1.7 million (Downtown Social Service Board, July 21, 2006). Unfortunately, not soon after these plans were drafted a new opposition began to develop, halting efforts and forcing the City to reconsider. A letter associated with the 1991 extension of the Swinging Door CUP 91-18 states that:

The Sun Street properties were not considered viable for reasons of distance and cost…Additionally, there was not a consensus of all homeless service providers that the Sun Street location was an appropriate site for these services (McNiff Personal Communication, November 13, 1991).

Interviews indicate that the bulk of the opposition eventually came from Sun Street Centers and the Victory Mission (Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006; Smith Interview, November 7, 2006; Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006; Dodd Interview,
October 31, 2006). One perceived problem was an incompatibility between the largely alcoholic and drug using population which frequents the Swinging Door and Victory Mission and those in rehabilitation at Sun Street Centers:

The guys that were sober were really getting very judgmental of the guys who were still drinking on the streets. And, the guys on the streets were really mad at the guys in the program…the old jargon was the people at the Mission were taking a dive. There [was] a real animosity between them (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).

Ultimately, Sun Street Centers came to oppose the relocation, viewing the close proximity of homeless services as not in the best interests of the recovery program. The Victory Mission on the other hand was nearing the end of their mortgage on the building at 43 Soledad Street. Larry Bussard reports that:

…somewhere along the line [the Victory Mission] board said, “this doesn’t make sense. Why do we want to move when we’ve almost got this building paid for?”…at the end of it, they had a very ceremonial burning of the mortgage, of the building their in…they had put a fair amount of money and a lot of blood, sweat and tears into that building (Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006).

The Mission and Sun Street Centers also shared one belief that pushed them both to oppose the relocation. In this case NIMBYism takes the form of a legitimate concern over the safety of local children from the perspectives of homeless service agencies themselves. Martin Dodd tells that:

…73 school aged children lived on Sun Street. The superintendent of the Victory Mission stated that the men who lined up on the street at five p.m. and let out at six a.m. undoubtedly included persons convicted of sex
offenses…Because the Mission and Sun Street opposed the move, the City Council rejected the idea (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).

Larry Bussard similarly recalls the collapse of Sun Street relocation plans:

…we went through that process, you know, for, seems like the better part of two years and ran into a political nightmare. Um, and, gave up frankly and switched courses to pursue the acquisition of the Green Gold Inn and to work with the Buddhist Temple and Franciscan Workers… (Bussard Interview, November 14, 2006).

At the end of the Sun Street relocation period, the City and the other various stakeholders faced the same question that prompted the search in the first place. Do they continue to pursue relocation, or attempt to resolve issues of conflict between the homeless community and local property owners, businesses and residents? The consensus seems to be that relocation had been tried, and so no further attention was paid to relocating the Swinging Door, and homeless services, from Soledad Street.

**Green Gold Inn, Dorothy’s Place, and the Wheel of Hope (1993-Present)**

Official discussion over the closure of the Swinging Door began in 1993. The overwhelming consensus is that Sun Street Centers plainly got tired of running the facility and began to loose faith in its usefulness:

Mr. Martin Dodd, Executive Director of Sun Street Centers stated that two facts must be accepted: A) when the Swinging Door was established it was expected to be a short-term solution, not a permanent facility; and B) given all the negative publicity, which it has received over the past eight years, there is no area in the City which will cooperatively accept the Swinging Door as a neighbor. It no longer meets the needs of the Buddhist Temple and business owners in the downtown area; nor does it keep
“street people” off Main Street; and, it prevents some homeless addicts
and alcoholics from improving their lives (Homeless Service Relocation
Committee, September 14, 1993).

Confronted with an end to Sun Street Centers involvement in the Swinging Door, the
DSSB began looking at other options for providing services in the area. The solution
came in the form of an agreement between the Buddhist Temple and the Franciscan
Workers, who had until this time been serving food in the lower half of the Republic
Hotel. It seems interesting why the Buddhist Temple, after eight years of opposition to
the facility’s presence suddenly became involved in providing services. A September 14,
1993 meeting between the Homeless Service Relocation Committee of the DSSB and the
City Council, provides some insight.

Mr. Uemura explained that the Buddhist Temple has been told for
approximately seven years that the location of the Swinging door is
temporary, and has been repeatedly told that the City was going to
redevelop the area. He explained how Larry Bussard, the Redevelopment
Director has tried to find an alternative site, without the funds to purchase
a new location, and now the money is available, but no one wants the
Swinging door in its neighborhood. Each time that the Swinging door has
requested a permit for operation, the Buddhist Temple has opposed it, but
the permit was issued anyway (Homeless Service Relocation Committee,
September 14, 1993).

Ultimately the Temple congregation concluded that if they could not influence the
establishment or relocation of the Swinging Door, they might as well become involved
with how the services are being provided and ensure the type of structure they believed
might help break the cycle of homelessness (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006). With
the Redevelopment Agency in orchestration, the Buddhist Temple and the Franciscan
Workers formed the “Wheel of Hope”, and merged with Housing for the Homeless to
become a non-profit.
The terms of the agreement allow the creation of what is today Dorothy’s Place Hospitality Center and established a ten-year time limit with a possible two-year extension (laid out in the Conditional Use Permit awarded by the City, facing expiration December 2006). The facility was to offer the same basic services as the Swinging Door and Dorothy’s Soup Kitchen, with the addition of case management services, medical treatment and counseling rooms, overnight shelter needs, and some individual rooms for rent to the general public (Don Lauritson, March 8, 1994). After twelve-years the Temple would receive veto power over the use of the Green Gold Inn where the facility is established (Wheel of Hope, Inc., December 2, 1994). Robert Smith, current director of Dorothy’s comments:

…we negotiated, We came up with by-laws for the Wheel of Hope and those by-laws stated that after twelve years the Buddhist Temple would have…veto power over our continued existence. So, it was, you know, a compromise on our part. We surrendered our long term freedom and possible viability to another entity for the sake of continuing in existence for at least twelve years, we though. And that’s where we’re at right now. You know, our feet are in the fire (Smith Interview, November 7, 2006).

Ultimately the closure of the Swinging Door and creation of the Wheel of Hope and Dorothy’s, seem to have had three major impacts on the current controversy over services on Soledad Street. As Martin Dodd puts it:

I warned all that there were conflicting objectives of the agencies involved. The Temple wanted people contained, the City wanted to continue to push people off the 100 block, and the Franciscan Workers wanted individuals to find and build dignity. What the Redevelopment Agency achieved was a new Swinging Door without public funding. The Franciscan Workers got a heartache. The Temple got disappointment (Dodd Interview, October 31, 2006).
The DSSB, which had once been the primary funding and regulatory agency for the Swinging Door, was now off the hook. They had effectively passed responsibility on to the Franciscan Worker and Buddhist Temple through the Wheel of Hope.

Once the Wheel of Hope board became active the Downtown Social Service Board, just kind of fell apart…Because it moved over the tracks from Main Street. You didn’t have that prevalent problem [in downtown] (Iwamoto Interview, October 31, 2006).

The result was that Dorothy’s Place and the Franciscan Workers could no longer benefit from the major City funding which had sustained the Swinging Door. As the DSSB began to unravel, the regulatory reporting which had allowed the Swinging Door facility to be monitored, and the benefits of the Swinging Door to be quantified, came under less supervision and eventually ceased.

After 1995 the records of the DSSB end all together and no conclusive history of its dismissal can be found, other than that related above. Today, the Wheel of Hope has reached the end of its twelfth year and the lack of capacity, due to the pullout of responsibility and funding, has resulted in a Dorothy’s which has not lived up to its hopes. Today we wait to see the outcome of the current CUP expiration and wonder if it will bring a new chapter to the story, or a conclusion, to the question of homeless services in Chinatown.

This concludes the historical analysis of Soledad Street homeless services and the DSSB as revealed through a qualitative review of the public records and first person interviews with individuals personally involved. The hope is that the documentation of this history may help to provide another resource for dialogue, and aid in an informed decision making process. The section that follows will describe some aspects of the content analysis of public records. This is being pursued in order to apply integrative theoretical concepts from UPE, NIMBY, and Redevelopment literatures to a quantitative perspective, thus add greater insight into the rationales behind these historical events.
Statistical Analysis

The following results are the product of the Content analysis process where the researcher has identified themes, patterns, and trends within the qualitative review. The specific objects of this analysis are references to the relocation of homeless services. These references have been counted and their relative frequency has been recorded. References that express a rational for or against relocation were categorized into four categories: NIMBYism, Cost/Benefit Accounting, Symbolic Politics, and Other. The frequencies of these references have been used to produce the statistical outputs discussed below. This analysis has produced unique insights into the association between NIMBYism and rationales for relocation, the relative agency of various stakeholders in the relocation discourse, and changes in the amount and content of the discourse over time.

The most significant finding of this analysis is the existence of a statistically significant relationship between NIMBYism and rationales for relocation. Table 1. illustrates the distribution of stated rationales for relocation, among the various categories identified in the methodology. Notice the high concentration of NIMBYist rationales that support the relocation effort. Similarly, cost/benefit accounting has its highest concentration in opposition to the relocation effort.

The association has been confirmed by a chi-square test comparing the frequency of NIMBYist rationales and rationales supporting relocation. A statistically significant relationship was found in which Chi-square ($X^2$) equals .002, the degree of freedom equals 1, and where $p$ equals less than the alpha level of .05. Ultimately, this association suggests that individuals expressing NIMBYist sentiments toward homeless populations are more likely to support the relocation of homeless serving facilities outside their neighborhood. Conversely it means that those who support relocation are more likely than not to do so for reasons of NIMBYism.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Rational Type</th>
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<th>Rational Con</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cost/Benefit Accounting</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>46</td>
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This, of course, is not an absolute association. By looking at the table 1 it is obvious that cost/benefit accounting is referenced nineteen times as a rational for relocating services and eleven references to NIMBYism were cited against relocating services. All NIMBYism is not, therefore, promoting relocation. But, I do believe the significance of the relationship is clear. NIMBYism has played a large role in the relocation of homeless services, and as will be discussed later, may have contributed to the identification of homeless services as a resource for the redevelopment in Downtown.

Prompted by references to exclusivity in the decision making process of growth coalitions (discussed in the literature review), the analysis has charted the relative agency of various stakeholder groups in expressing their positions toward relocation. Figure 1. illustrates the frequency of expression for each stakeholder group, and provides an interesting realization. As can be drastically seen, the Salinas City government has overwhelmingly dominated the discourse around the relocation of services. Contrary to expectations the local business community and County government have been virtually silent in the relocation process. This is strange considering their expressed commitment in

**Figure 1.** Frequency of Expression by Stakeholder Group at DSSB Meetings
the Joint Powers Agreement and their obvious stake in the relocation effort. The service providers and property owners represent a somewhat higher percentage of the references than business or County government. This can be explained by their inclusion in the relocation process. Since relocation of services had already been written into area redevelopment plans, it seems that the homeless service providers and neighborhood stakeholders had more to gain from active participation.

Changes in the relocation discourse have also been charted over time to illustrate fluctuations in the amount and content of discussions. Figure 2. below illustrates changes in the amount of discussion over a fourteen year period. Each year is illustrated by the cumulative involvement of all stakeholders. Notice the major spikes in the discussion in 1985, 1987, 1991, and 1992. The first three correspond with CUP proceedings for the Swinging Door at the Republic Hotel location on Soledad Street. The fourth spike (1992) represents the height of the Sun Street relocation effort. These seem to be natural circumstances for heightened discussion.

**Figure 2.** Amount of Discussion by Year

![Figure 2](image_url)
Of more significant impact are the drastic lulls which can be seen to follow the major peaks in discussion. For example, 1985 witnessed nearly 15 references to the relocation of the Swinging Door. The same year saw the promise of relocation from Soledad Street and the appeal of the CUP for establishment of the Swinging Door in the Republic Hotel. In 1986, after being granted a two year CUP, the promised relocation is referenced less than five times. This suggests that action is avoided unless a catalyst is produced, such as the expiration of a CUP, the presence of community opposition, or direct instruction by City Council to relocate services. It seems likely that after 1985 and the relocation to Soledad Street, the primary function of the Swinging Door had already been accomplished (that is removing the homeless from Downtown). The lack of action following that relocation, despite promises to relocated, puts suspicion on the DSSB’s commitment to promises, and their intentions in relocating the Swinging Door to Soledad Street.

The two figures depicted below represent changes in the content of the relocation discourse over time. Both figures reflect the fluctuations in the amount of discussion but provide data on the types of rationales being expressed and their position in supporting or opposing relocation.

Figure 3. illustrates the use of different rationales in supporting or opposing relocation. Notice the large peak in the use of cost/benefit accounting in 1987. At closer inspection of the actual references, this can be attributed to members of the DSSB expressing reasons why the relocation of services from Soledad Street had not been accomplished and how Soledad Street is the most appropriate location for services. These include problems of relocating the current tenants of the Sun Street labor camps, and the $1.2 to $1.7 million cost of the relocation. The peaks of 1991 and 1992 correspond as well with the serious consideration and collapse of Sun Street relocation plans.

In Figure 4., it is 1984, 1987, and 1992 that warrant the most attention. Notice in 1984 the large rise in references supporting relocation and the beginning of opposition toward the Swinging Door. This marks, as you can likely guess, the arrival of the Swinging Door on Soledad Street. The huge rise in opposition shown in 1987, however, is not representing the opposition of the Soledad Street community, but that of the DSSB itself. This corresponds to the rise in cost/benefit accounting mentioned in relation to Figure 3. The
Figure 3. Amount of Discussion Over Time

Figure 4. Support and Opposition by Year
year 1992, again, references the Sun Street attempt, this time highlighting a large amount of support for relocation being voiced by the DSSB.

Overall, these results are quite significant. Alone their presentation would be virtually meaningless. Within the context of the historical review however, this data takes on a new meaning. The section to follow helps to illuminate that meaning and identifies factors addressing the original research question. That is:

What factors have contributed to the inability to find a permanent location for the provision of homeless services in Central Salinas?

Conclusions

The history related above is complicated. Its documentation and analysis have been equally so. Despite this, the combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis has produced three factors that have contributed to the inability to find a permanent location for the provision of homeless services in central Salinas. The primary factor that has influenced all others was the creation of the Swinging Door as a resource for the redevelopment of the Downtown, which may not necessarily benefit the homeless population. Subsequent two factors include the creation of the DSSB as a growth coalition, and the transfer of responsibility through the creation of the Wheel of Hope.

The Swinging Door has been deemed a resource for redevelopment for two reasons. Its stated purpose from the very beginning has been the removal of the homeless from the Streets of Downtown. Whether this meant bringing them inside and out of sight, or removing them to another part of town, this fact is undeniable. Second the statistical relationship between NIMBYism and the relocation of the Swinging Door suggests that relocation efforts were simply an extension of the Swinging Door’s original purpose. Ultimately, the move from Downtown to Soledad Street had little or nothing to do with the provision of services and more to do with the perceived negative impacts that the homeless might have on the redevelopment effort. This simple trend has set the tone for the entire process, and has impacted the rise of the other two factors.
At the creation of the Downtown Social Service Board its stated purpose was to manage funding and to study, plan, and implement services for the homeless. Although concern was given to the needs of the homeless through countless assessments, and were considered during the various relocation plans, the makeup and major actions of the DSSB do not seem to hold the end of homelessness as a high priority.

More so, the accomplishment of the Swinging Door’s main purpose seems to have driven the group to pursue the relocation of services and the distribution of operational costs away from the Downtown business association. The relative avoidance and lack of participation from the County of Monterey, coupled with the City’s deep commitment to redevelopment, focused the bulk of funding responsibility on the City. The City of Salinas, the County of Monterey, and the Salinas Oldtown Association all held high stakes in the redevelopment of Downtown. Thus it was the purpose of the Joint Powers Agreement to help distribute funding responsibilities amongst the involved organizations.

The role of the Swinging Door as a redevelopment resource puts the makeup and actions of the DSSB in perspective as a growth coalition. You may recall from the literature review that a growth coalition is an aggregation of specific local actors and institutions with land-use and growth interests. Such a coalition is necessarily undemocratic so that it may remain unaccountable for the negative impacts of the growth process. The members of the Joint Powers Agreement are in line with this definition and the inclusion of community members and service providers other than Sun Street Centers (as the organization running the Swinging Door) seems to have been pursued because their involvement was necessary for the completion of the Soledad Street relocation. Remaining completely undemocratic would have doomed the relocation effort and forced the Swinging Door to remain in the Downtown, consistent with insights from UPE literature.

Finally, the third factor contributing to an unstable situation for homeless services in the Soledad Street neighborhood was a shift in responsibility that occurred at the creation of the Wheel of Hope, Inc. Essentially, the DSSB was able to pass responsibility for funding and oversight of Dorothy’s Place (the new Swinging Door) onto the Franciscan Worker and Buddhist Temple. This allowed the City to shrug off a burdensome expense
and the DSSB to disband with their primary goal achieved (consistent with insights from NIMBY literature)

Relating to today’s controversy, much of the trouble stems from the three factors above in creating an atmosphere where services have become part of an overall structure of inter-spatial competition and the marginalization of a particular area of town. In the drive for economic growth, the relative influence of the Downtown community allowed them to manipulate the City’s redevelopment process to solve its social problems, but only at the expense of a nearby area. This provides a perfect example of how inter-spatial competition can impact urban development outcomes, and how homeless services can become a development resource for a NIMBYistic community, not necessarily for their own benefits.

**Contributions**

The ultimate lesson of this case is that the containment and relocation of a troubled population was deemed more efficient and cost effective than attempting to address the underlying personal and socio-economic causes of homelessness, due to the presence of “someone else’s backyard”. Exclusionary tactics towards any unwanted population or facility can only work so long as there is somewhere for it to go. Today, as Soledad Street begins the process of revitalization, the question has arisen again. What was once considered “over there” and “across the tracks” has now become valuable as the next step in the economic growth of central Salinas. It is beyond the scope of this research to decide whether relocation is the right choice for the future of the area. What can be said is that in this case a policy of removal had detracted from the ability of services to establish legitimately and effectively address the issues and causes of homelessness.
**Recommendations**

At this point in the revitalization project, based on the results of this research, I would recommend that the City of Salinas pursue research to investigate the most appropriate location for the provision of homeless services in the City of Salinas. This should accompany a thoroughly review of contemporary research on homelessness, its causes and realistic solutions, and an investigation of compatible locations. The search for compatible locations should not be limited to those properties that are currently available but should encompass all properties that would meet the necessary service and compatibility needs of the homeless and the greater community. Nor should the Soledad Street or Downtown neighborhoods be excluded from consideration outright.

The purpose of such a study would be to gain perspective on the possibilities for providing services to competently address the issues, causes, and symptoms of homelessness in Salinas in a way that can coexist with multiple neighboring uses, such as residential, light industrial, and retail. Results of such a study could then be used to set the long term policy goals of the City and County to break the cycle illustrated in this research. The location, or locations, identified could be written into a long-term plan that could be implemented over a ten to twenty year period.

For the short term, it is recommended that revitalization efforts be pursued with as much support as possible from the City, County, local residents, business, religious/cultural groups, and the homeless community. In support of that revitalization effort it may be important for services to receive the full support from the community to provide the highest quality of services possible. By building the capacity of the providers it is likely that they may be able to more effectively address the issues which most highly impact the surrounding community. As is illustrated above, the history of services in this neighborhood is marked by a lack of support for providers in addressing the real issues. For the revitalization process to continue it will be vital that these services are allowed to increase their capacity for ameliorating personal and social blight. But they cannot do it alone.
Documents and Records


Downtown Salinas Social Service Center Board. (March 6, 1986). Minutes. Salinas, CA: No Author.


Downtown Social Service Board. (March 5, 1987). Minutes. Salinas, CA: No Author.


References


Knox, D. and Thornton, B. (2002). “*Not In My Backyard*: The Situational and


Appendix A: Timelines
Time Lines

**Historical Events**
- Joint Powers Agreement
- Creation of the Wheel of Hope, Inc.
- Swinging Door CUP 84-40 Appeal
- Swinging Door Opens on Soledad St.
- Phase II Redevelopment Strategy
- Hight of Sun Street Relocation Attempt
- Soledad & Lake Street Relocation Attempt
- Swinging Door Established
- Salinas Central City Planning and Revitalization Program Study
- 1970
- 1975
- 1980
- 1985
- 1990
- 1995

**Conditional Use Permits**
- Swinging Door CUP 84-40
- Swinging Door CUP 87-24
- Swinging Door CUP 91-18
- Green Gold Inn CUP 94-19
- Swinging Door CUP 89-16
- Swinging Door CUP 93-1A
- Swinging Door CUP 93-19
- 1984
- 1986
- 1988
- 1990
- 1992
- 1994